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Abstract
In this paper, we study an interference avoidance scenario in the presence of a smart interferer
which can rapidly observe the transmit power of a backscatter wireless sensor network (WSN) and
effectively interrupt backscatter signals. We consider a power control with a sub-channel allocation
to avoid interference attacks and a time-switching ratio for backscattering and RF energy harvesting
in backscatter WSNs. We formulate the problem based on a Stackelberg game theory and compute
the optimal transmit power, time-switching ratio, and sub-channel allocation parameter to maximize a
utility function against the smart interference. We propose two algorithms for the utility maximization
using Lagrangian dual decomposition for the backscatter WSN and the smart interference to prove the
existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Numerical results show that the proposed algorithms effectively
maximize the utility, compared to that of the algorithm based on the Nash game, so as to overcome
smart interference in backscatter communications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently backscatter wireless sensor networks (WSNs), where a massive number of distributed
sensors simultaneously perform backscatter communications for information transmission and
radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting, have been attracting the upsurge of interests [1], [2].
However, backscatter WSNs are very vulnerable to interference because of a very low signal
strength in their backscattering signals. Especially, in a smart interfering environment where
backscatter signals are detected and attacked by the intentional smart interferer, backscatter
sensors are required to establish transmission strategies to overcome or avoid the smart inter-
ference. Therefore, the motivation of this paper is to solve the problem of how to overcome
the smart interference in backscatter WSNs and obtain the best utility of backscatter WSNs.
The various previous works, such as utilizing harvest-then-transmit protocol [3], [4], a Nash
game theory-based jamming defense with power control [5] and medium access control game
[6], and a Stackelberg game-based smart jamming problem [7] by a smart jammer that throws
threats on cognitive radio networks with power control [8], have been studied. However, optimal
transmission strategy in the smart interference environment that maximizes its own utility, while
spying on each other’s transmission strategy in backscatter communications with RF energy
harvesting, has not yet been investigated.
In this paper, we formulate the smart interference problem based on the Stackelberg game
theory as a hierarchical structure-based leader-follower game. Our game model is that two players
(a smart interferer and a backscatter WSN) are alternately optimizing their utilities as they explore
their opponents’ transmission strategies [9]. The smart interferer observes the backscatter WSNs
signal power and calculates optimal interference power to reduce the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) of the backscatter WSN considering the smart interferers own battery energy.
Then the backscatter WSN observes the smart interferers interference power and shifts the current
sub-channel to a different sub-channel with less interference while performing power control.
Therefore, we try to solve the smart interference problem with the hierarchical structure-based
Stackelberg game theory rather than the simultaneous structure-based Nash game theory.
The contribution of this paper is to propose a new transmission strategy based on Stackel-
berg game theory and Lagrangian dual decomposition that effectively improves the utility of
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backscatter WSNs in the smart interference environment. To overcome the smart interference in
backscatter WSNs, the proposed transmission strategy is composed of two resource allocation
algorithms allocating optimal transmit power, time-switching ratio, and sub-channel allocation
parameter under practical constraints. Furthermore, with the proposed algorithms, we prove the
existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium which means a converged value that can no longer
increase the utility of backscatter WSNs.
A. Operation of Backscatter WSN under Smart Interferer
As shown in Fig. 4, backscatter tags can harvest energy from transmitted signals from a hybrid-
access point (H-AP) and reflect the signal to transmit its own backscatter data signal back to
the H-AP. We consider a backscatter WSN consisting of n={1,· · · ,N} tags, and k={1,· · · ,K}
represents sub-channels which are shifted frequencies for backscattering [10]. The backscatter
tags are equipped with a single antenna and operated by time-division multiple access (TDMA).
We consider a transmission protocol operating within one block transmission time T and the
time-switching ratio allocated to time for energy harvesting as (1− ρ)T , and allocated to time
for backscattering as ρT . Hence, the amount of the harvested energy at the n-th tag can be
represented as:
En = η(1− ρ)ThnPt,n, (1)
where Pt,n is the transmit power at the H-AP and η denotes the energy harvesting efficiency for
all tags. hn is channel gain from the H-AP to the n-th tag, which is defined as:
hn = GtGrλ
2
B/(4pirn)
2. (2)
Here, Gt is the antenna gain of the H-AP and Gr the antenna gain of the tag. λB is the
wavelength of the signal transmitted from the H-AP. rn is the distance between the H-AP and
the n-th tag. After energy harvesting during the time (1− ρ)T , the tag performs backscattering
to transmit its own data using the harvested energy during the time ρT . The average transmit
power for the n-th tag can be represented as:
PB,n = En/(ρT ∗ tn), (3)
[TECHNICAL REPORT] 4
Fig. 1. The backscatter WSN under the smart interferer.
where tn is a time slot equally allocated among users for TDMA systems. Hence, we can obtain
the received SINR for the n-th tag at the receiver as [11]:
SINRk,n =
δk,nP
re
B,n
PI ln +NB
=
δk,nPB,nhn | Γ0 − Γ1 |2
PI ln +NB
, (4)
where P reB,n is the transmit power of the n-th backscatter tag, Γ0 and Γ1 are the reflection
coefficients [11]. NB is noise power, which is assumed that the noise is negligible compared to
the interference caused by the smart interferer. δk,n ∈ {1, 0} the binary indicator allocating the
k-th kub-channel to the H-AP, and PI the interference power at the interferer. ln is the channel
gain from the interferer to the tags, which is defined as:
ln = GiGtλ
2
j/(4pirj)
2. (5)
Here, Gi is the antenna gain of the smart interferer, λj is the wavelength of the signal transmitted
from the smart interferer, and rj,nis the distance from the smart interferer to the n-th tag.
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B. Optimization Problem Formulation Based on Stackelberg Game Model
In our game model, the smart interferer as a follower observes the transmit power of the
backscatter WSN and maximizes its utility, then the backscatter WSN as a leader observes the
interference power of the follower and maximizes its utility. Based on the game model, we
formulated Stackelberg game as G = (N ,A,U), where N is the set of players comprised of
the smart interferer and the backscatter WSN. A is the constraint set, and U the utility set. In
P1, the utility of the smart interferer, UI , is defined as how much smart interferer can reduce
the SINR of the backscatter WSN under the smart interferers battery limit. As a mobile device,
the smart interferer cannot enhance the interference effect by increasing the interference power
indefinitely, and should interfere considering its limited battery power. To solve P1, we have
assumed that the smart interferer can instantaneously observe and determine the transmit power
of the backscatter WSN. P reB,n, and sub-channel in which backscatter signal is present, δk,n.
Further, we assumed that other parameter are known. In P2, UB is the utility of the backscatter
WSN to maximize the SINR with the least transmit power and harvest enough power for the
backscatter WSN simultaneously. The optimization problem for the two players is formulated
as:
(P1) max
PI∈AI
UI(PI | P reB,n)
= −
N∑
n=1
δk,nη((1− ρ)/(ρtn))h2nPt,n | Γ0 − Γ1 |2
PI ln +NB
− CIPI ,
(6)
subject to: AI = {(PI | P reB,n) | PI < PI,max}. (7)
(P2) max
PB,n,ρ∈AB
UB(Pt,n, ρ | PI)
=
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
δk,nη((1− ρ)/(ρtn))h2nPt,n | Γ0 − Γ1 |2
PI ln +NB
− CBPt,n,
(8)
subject to:AB =


(Pt,n, ρ | PI) |
SINRk,n ≥ SINRTH
En ≥ ρTPB,THtn
Pt,n < Pt,max
δk,n = {0, 1}
ρ = [0, 1]
En > η(1− ρ)TPEHTH


. (9)
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Here, PI,max is the maximum interference power of the smart interferer, Pt,max the maximum
transmit power of the H-AP, and PB,TH the minimum input power of the tag for backscat-
tering [12]. PEHTH is a minimum harvested power for the backscatter WSN [2] and SINRTH
is a minimum SINR to overcome the smart interferenIce [10] and enable reliable backscatter
communications. CB and CI (unit: per unit power) are used to express the prices (or costs) of
unit transmit power and unify the unit of the utility functions [7], [8].
II. UTILITY OPTIMIZATION BASED ON STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we propose two utility optimization algorithms for the smart interferer and
backscatter WSN to drive the Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game G.
A. Smart Interferers Best Response Strategy
To maximally interrupt the backscatter communication of the backscatter WSN under limited
energy constraint, we maximize the utility of the smart interferer, as a part of the Stackelberg
game along with Largrange dual method.
Theorem 1: There exists a unique solution set {PI} to maximize UI(PI | P reB,n).
Proof 1: If the Hessian matrixH(UI) is negative definite, P1 is strictly concave. The Hessian
matrix H(UI) is represented:
H(UI) = [∂2UI(PI | P reB,n)/∂P 2I ].
The second order partial derivative of UI(PI | P reB,n) is:
∂2UI(PI | P reB,n)
∂P 2I
= −
N∑
n
2((1− ρ)/ρ)Pt,nAk,nl2nρ2
(PI , ln +NB)3
, (10)
where Ak,n = δk,nηh
2
n | Γ0 − Γ1 |2 /tn. Therefore, H(UI) is strictly concave and P1 has a
critical point. Then, we can solve P1 by using the Lagrange multiplier method. We can write
the Lagrange dual function with the Lagrange multiplier ζn as:
LI(PI , ζn) = UI(PI | P reB,n) +
N∑
n=1
ζn(PI,max − PI), (11)
The Lagrange dual problem of P1 can be formulated as:
min
{ζn}
max
{PI}
LI(PI , ζn). (12)
[TECHNICAL REPORT] 7
Then, the optimal interference power P ∗I is calculated (details is given in Appendix):
P ∗I =
[
(
√
ln((1− ρ)/ρ)Pt,nAk,n/(CI + ζn)−NB)/ln
]+
, (13)
where [Z]+ = max{Z, 0}. As with multilevel water filling, the optimal values are carried out
in (13). Moreover, the Lagrange multiplier ζn can be updated by using gradient methods in a
distributed manner as:
ζn(TI + 1) = [ζn(TI)− ω1 ∗ (PI,max − P ∗I )]+, (14)
where the parameter TI is the number of iterations. The iteration step ω1 is a positive value like
a learning rate to converge the algorithm faster. The proposed maximization algorithm for the
smart interferers utility is given in Table I, lines 1-4.
B. Backscatter WSN’s Optimal Strategy
In [10], the backscatter WSN can shift a frequency band. We assume that the backscatter WSN
conducts frequency shifting to a different sub-channel with less interference when the current
sub-channel is under attack from the smart interferer. The binary indicator allocating the k-th
sub-channel is defined:
δ∗k,n =


1, if Pt,n > Pt,max in the kth sub channel
where k = argmaxk SINRk,n.
0, otherwise.
(15)
Then, the backscatter WSN performs the power control on the shifted sub-channel against the
smart interferer. Note that harvesting the interference power is neglected by the proposed sub-
channel shifting strategy to avoid the interference. The P2 function can be formulated as an
optimization problem:
Theorem 2: There exists a unique solution set {Pt,n, ρ} to maximize UB(Pt,n, ρ | PI).
Proof 2: If the Hessian matrix H(UB) is negative definite, P2 is strictly concave. The
Hessian matrix H(UB) is represented as
H(UB) =

 ∂2UB/∂P 2t,n ∂2UB/∂Pt,n∂ρ
∂2UB/∂Pt,n∂ρ ∂2UB/∂ρ2

 .
The second-order partial derivative of UB(Pt,n, ρ | PI) is:
[TECHNICAL REPORT] 8
TABLEI
MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM FOR SMART INTERFERERS UTILITY
(LINES 1-4, PERFORMED BY SMART INTERFERER)
1: Input: SINRTH ,PB,TH ,η,PB,max,PI,max,Pt,n,ρ,tn,ν,ζn,αk,n,βn,
µn,γk,n,ω1, · · · , ω7 > 0,T=TI=TB=1.
2: Compute the optimal P ∗I ,ζ
∗
n according to (13) and (14).
3: If UI(T ) > UI(T − 1), Retrun P
T+1
I =P
∗
I ,ζ
T+1
n =ζ
∗
n and obtain the
optimal utility set UI(T ).
4: else go to line 2 and let TI=TI+1.
MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM FOR BACKSCATTER WSNS UTILITY
(LINES 5-8, PERFORMED BY BACKSCATTER WSN)
5: Input: P ∗I . IFPt,n > Pt,max, Shift to a different sub-channel with
less interference according to (15).
6: If UB(T ) > UB(T − 1), ReturnP
T+1
t,n =P
∗
t,n,ρ
T+1=ρ∗,
αT+1k,n =α
∗
k,n,β
T+1
n =β
∗
n,µ
T+1
n =µ
∗
n,ν
T+1=ν∗,τT+1=τ∗,γT+1k,n =γ
∗
k,n
and obtain the optimal utility set UB(T ) and let T=T+1.
7: else Update P ∗t,n=Pt,n(TB + 1),ρ
∗=ρ(TB + 1),α
∗
k,n=αk,n(TB + 1),
β∗n=βn(TB + 1),µ
∗
n=µn(TB + 1),ν
∗=ν(TB + 1),τ
∗=τ (TB + 1),
γ∗k,n=γk,n(TB + 1) according to (21-28).
8: Go to line 6 and let TB=TB+1.
∂2UB
∂P 2t,n
= −(1− ρ)Ak,n
4
√
CI + ζn
lnρ(1− ρ)Ak,nP 3t,n
, (16)
∂2UB
∂ρ2
=
Bk,n(4ρ− 3)
4(ρ4 − ρ3)(Ak,nPt,n(ρ− ρ2)/Cn)1/2 , (17)
∂2UB
∂Pt,nρ
=
∂2UB
∂ρPt,n
= −Dk,n(1− 2ρ)Ak,n(ρ− 1)
4Cn
√
Dk,n(ρ− ρ2)/Cn
, (18)
where Bk,n = lnPt,nAk,n and Cn = CI + ζn. Therefore, H(UB) is strictly concave and P2 has
a critical point. Then, we can solve P2 by using the Lagrange multiplier method. We write the
dual Lagrange function of P2 as:
LB(Pt,n, ρ, αk,n, βn, τ, µn, ν, γk,n) = UB(Pt,n, ρ | PI)+
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
{αk,n(SINRk,n − SINRTH) + γk,n(ηhnPt,n
− ηTPEHTH )}+
N∑
n=1
{βn(Pt,max − Pt,n) + ν(1 − ρ)
τρ+ µn(En − tnρTPB,TH)},
(19)
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Fig. 2. Time-switching ratio ρ for an optimum utility of the backscatter WSN
where µn and ν are Lagrange multipliers. Therefore, we describe the dual Lagrange problem of
P2 as:
min
{ αk,n,βn,τ,µn,ν,γk,n}
max
{Pt,n,ρ}
LB,n(Pt,n, ρ, αk,n, βn, τ, µn, ν, γk,n). (20)
The optimal values are derived as (details are in Appendix):
P ∗t,n =
[
Cn
Ak,nln(1− ρ)(
(1 + αk,n)(1− ρ)Ak,n
2Ek,n
)2
]+
, (21)
ρ∗ =
[
−1/4 + 1/2(G1/2k,n − (1/2−Gk,n −G−1/4k,n )
]+
, (22)
where Dk,n = η(ρ − 1)hn(µnT + γk,n) − CB − βn, Ek,n = ηhnTPt,n + tnTPB,TH + ν −
τ, Fk,n =
Cn
Ak,nPt,n
(
(1+αk,n)Bk,n
2Ek,n
)2 and Gk,n = 1/4 − ( 3
√
2 · 12Fk,n/(Fk,n(3
√
768Fk,n + 81 −
27))1/3)+(−27Fk,n+3Fk,n
√
768Fk,n + 81)
1/3/3 3
√
2. The Lagrange multipliers αk,n, βn, τ, µn, ν, and γk,n
are updated by using the gradient methods. The parameter TB the number of iterations. Constant
coefficients ω2, · · · , ω7 positive iteration steps as:
αk,n(TB + 1) = [αk,n(TB)− ω2(SINR∗k,n − SINRTH)]+, (23)
βn(TB + 1) = [βn(TB)− ω3(Pt,max − P ∗t,n)]+, (24)
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the smart interferers utility between the proposed algorithm and the one based on the Nash game
µn(TB + 1) = [µn(TB)− ω4(E∗n − ρTPB,THtn)]+, (25)
τ(TB + 1) = [τ(TB)− ω5ρ∗]+, (26)
ν(TB + 1) = [ν(TB)− ω6(1− ρ∗)]+, (27)
γk,n(TB + 1) = [γk,n(TB)− ω7(ηhnPt,n − ηTPEHTH )]+. (28)
The proposed maximization algorithm for backscatter WSNs utility is given in Table I, lines
5-8, and performed at the backscatter WSN.
III. RESULTS
For the numerical results, we set parameters as the total number of tags N=3, 5 and 10,
PB,TH=-18dBm [12], P
EH
TH =-22dBm [2], SINRTH=10dB [10], CI=CB=1 [8-9], η=0.5, tt,n=1/N ,
Γ0=1, Γ1=-1 [11], PB,max=20dBm [7], PI,max=30dBm [7], Gt=Gi=6dBi, Gr=1.8dBi [12], and
K=14. The backscatter WSN operates in 2.4 GHz ISM band. We assume a scenario where
the backscatter WSN has a coverage up to 5 meters in one office space in a building, and the
interferer should be located far enough from the coverage of the backscatter WSN considering
that it is physically easy to be detected and removed. On the other hand, to prevent the effect of
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the backscatter WSNs utility between the proposed algorithm and the one based on the Nash game
the interference attack from becoming very small due to too far distance from the backscatter
WSN, rj,nis set to a proper distance of 10 meters. Based on the mobile-type smart jammer [13]
which could act as the smart interferer, the smart interferer is simulated using MATLAB. Fig. 2
shows the time-switching ratio for the optimum utility of the backscatter WSN. We allocate the
time-switching ρ for RF energy harvesting using the Lagrange multiplier method. The utility of
the backscatter WSN attains the maximum when the time-switching ratio ρ is 0.45. Thus, we
can allocate the optimal time-switching ratio for backscattering and RF energy harvesting in the
backscatter WSN.
Fig. 3 shows the comparison of the results of the proposed algorithm of the smart interferer
with those of the algorithm based on the Nash game. The Nash game does not consider the
hierarchical structure, due to which the proposed algorithm of the smart interferer provides an
increased utility over that of the algorithm based on the Nash game, which implies the proposed
algorithm efficiently interferes with the backscatter WSN.
Fig. 4 demonstrates each game model reaches its own equilibrium where the utility no longer
increases and converges, but the Stackelberg game-based curves converge to the higher utility
than that of the Nash game-based curves at the last round 8. This means that applying the
hierarchical structure-based Stackelberg game theory is a more realistic and appropriate way
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to solve the smart interference problem. It should be noted that the smart interferer in this
paper is assumed to be the smartest one with malicious intention and to perform the proposed
interferers utility maximization algorithm. If the smart interferer uses another algorithm which
would probably be less efficient and uses higher power to interfere, the backscatter WSN’s utility
could be even higher due to faster energy depletion of the interferer.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated the smart interference problem in the interaction between the
backscatter WSN and the smart interferer. We have proposed two resource allocation algorithms
based on the Stackelberg game and proved the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium. The
results showed that the proposed algorithms yield an increased utility over that of the algorithm
based on the Nash game.
APPENDIX
DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL VALUE (13)
By solving the following formula derived by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we
can simply derive the optimal values of P ∗I : ∂LI(PI , ζn)/∂PI
=
lnPt,nAk,n(1− ρ)
ρ(PI ln +NB)2
− CI − ζn


= 0, PI,n > 0,
< 0, otherwise.
(29)
DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL VALUE (21-22)
The optimal values,P ∗t,n and ρ
∗, are derived by the KKT conditions, respectively, by solving the
following equations: ∂LB(Pt,n, ρ, αk,n, βn, τ, µn, ν, γk,n)/∂Pt,n
=
(1 + αk,n)(1− ρ)Ak,n
2
√
(1− ρ)Bk,n/Cn
−Dk,n


= 0, Pt,n > 0,
< 0, otherwise.
(30)
∂LB(Pt,n, ρ, αk,n, βn, τ, µn, ν, γk,n)/∂ρ
= − (1 + αk,n)Bk,n
2ρ2
√
(1− ρ)Pt,nAk,n/ρCn
− Ek,n


= 0, ρ > 0,
< 0, otherwise.
(31)
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